We develop a new puzzle concerning a material being's relationship to the smallest parts of the material world. In particular, we investigate how a being could be responsible for anything if its be...

Entangled by modernism -- Archaeological use of theories -- Object science -- Group formation, dissent, and change -- A method for analyzing cultural action -- Fragmenting the Bronze Age -- Contestation in the Hopewell.

Science and religious faith are two of the most important and influential forces in human life, yet there is widespread confusion about how, or indeed whether, they link together. This book describes this combination from the perspective of one who finds that they link together productively and creatively.

In Knowledge and Social Construction Andrew Koch asks: how can we know the absolute best path through politics toward a better society? We can't. However, if our claims to social knowledge are more hypothetical in nature than absolute the resultant society will be more open.

We uncover a surprising discovery about the basis of thoughts. We begin by giving some plausible axioms about thoughts and their grounds. We then deduce a theorem, which has dramatic ramifications for the basis of all thoughts. The theorem implies that thoughts cannot come deterministically from any purely “thoughtless” states. We expect this result to be too dramatic for many philosophers. Hence, we proceed to investigate the prospect of giving up the axioms. We show that each axiom’s negation itself has (...) dramatic consequences that should be of interest to philosophers of mind. Our proof of the theorem provides a new guiderail for thinking about the nature and origin of thoughts. (shrink)

Poststructuralism and the Politics of Method examines the political possibilities emerging with poststructuralist epistemology. Beginning with the premises for the construction of knowledge claims, Koch explores the dimensions of materialism, democracy, power, leftist politics, and other themes emerging from the this twentieth century philosophic movement.

This book examines the process philosophies of Whitehead and others against current discussions of astrobiology, extraterrestrial life, and their engagement by theological and religious systems.

A engaging dialogue with the modern “axionoetic” proposals of A.N. Whitehead, Keith Ward, and John Leslie, arguing for the relational nature of ultimacy wherein Mind and Value, Possibility and Actuality, God and the World are affirmed as ultimate only in virtue of their relationality. This relationship Whitehead calls “mutual immanence.”.

We prove the following surprising property of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus, IpC. Consider the collection of formulas, φ, built up from propositional variables (p,q,r,...) and falsity $(\perp)$ using conjunction $(\wedge)$ , disjunction (∨) and implication (→). Write $\vdash\phi$ to indicate that such a formula is intuitionistically valid. We show that for each variable p and formula φ there exists a formula Apφ (effectively computable from φ), containing only variables not equal to p which occur in φ, and such that for (...) all formulas ψ not involving $p, \vdash \psi \rightarrow A_p\phi$ if and only if $\vdash \psi \rightarrow \phi$ . Consequently quantification over propositional variables can be modelled in IpC, and there is an interpretation of the second order propositional calculus, IpC2, in IpC which restricts to the identity on first order propositions. An immediate corollary is the strengthening of the usual interpolation theorem for IpC to the statement that there are least and greatest interpolant formulas for any given pair of formulas. The result also has a number of interesting consequences for the algebraic counterpart of IpC, the theory of Heyting algebras. In particular we show that a model of IpC2 can be constructed whose algebra of truth-values is equal to any given Heyting algebra. (shrink)

Drawing on the genealogical tradition developed by Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault,Democracy and Domination argues that from the time of Ancient Greece to the present, the collective and centralizing aspects of power have been expanding in the Western world. Modern democracy should be seen as a system of domination that assists in the coordination and expansion of collective power.

It is argued that a chief obstacle to a naturalistic explanation of the origins of mind is human exceptionalism, as exempli fi ed in the seventeenth century by René Descartes and in the twentieth century by Noam Chomsky. As an antidote to human exceptionalism, we turn to the account of aesthetic judgment in Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man , according to which the mental capacities of humans differ from those of lower animals only in degree, and not in kind. Thoroughgoing (...) naturalistic explanation of these capacities is made easier by shifting away from the substance-metaphysical implications of the search for an account of mind , toward a dispositional account of the origins of mindfulness . (shrink)

Recent studies in canine communication are reviewed using Deacon’s framework of iconic, indexical, and symbolic reference. The presented analysis examines these studies using Deacon’s notion of interpretant, taking into account the evolutionary and perceptual capacities of the dog. By taking these dispositions and capacities into account, the conclusions that have been drawn in current studies of canine communication with respect to Deacon’s framework are critically evaluated. The analysis proceeds by investigating clusters of studies that align with symbolic, indexical, or iconic (...) reference. (shrink)

Alienation, as a theme, deeply pervaded both the work and life of Max Weber, one of the pillars of modern sociology. In this excellent new book, Andrew M. Koch analyzes the genesis of the conecpt of alienation and then, in a brilliant and imaginative turn, works to recreate the context in which Weber understood alienation in both the intellectual and lived sense.

Psychology plays an increasingly important role in today's society. Its influence can be seen all around us - be it in the home, the workplace, the school or our private lives. A uniquely diverse discipline, it ranges from social psychology to biological aspects of behaviour, and from basic research to the applied professions. This _Companion Encyclopedia_ covers all these main branches of psychological research and professional practice. The thematic arrangement is the result of the Editor's extensive research into syllabi, from (...) which he distilled the 13 most frequently taught units. Students can consult and be referred to sections relating to their lecture programme, and can find lucid definitions of frequently used terms in the Glossary. Headings and sub-headings are clearly highlighted at the beginning of each chapter - ideal for quick reference. * Provides authoritative and in-depth reference material on all major branches of psychological research and professional practice * Contributors include many of the world's most eminent psychologists * Written in a lively style without assuming previous knowledge of the subject * Structured according to the core topics appearing most often as discrete modules in contemporary psychology courses * Detailed bibliographies, further reading sections, exhaustive index and glossary of technical terms * Containing 165 supporting illustrations. (shrink)

This clear and lively introduction to psychology assumes no prior knowledge of the subject. Extensively revised and updated, this third edition describes psychology as it is taught at universitues. Examples are used throughout to illustrate fundamental ideas, with a self-assessment quiz focusing readers' minds on a number of intriguing psychological problems. The differences betwen psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis are explained, and the professions and careers associated with psychology are explored. Suggestions for further reading and useful internet sites are included.

The animalist says we are animals. This thesis is commonly understood as the universal generalization that all human persons are human animals. This article proposes an alternative: the thesis is a generic that admits of exceptions. We defend the resulting view, which we call ‘generic animalism’, and show its aptitude for diagnosing the limits of eight case-based objections to animalism.

Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims—that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan—unburdened by modal or criterial commitments—still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case (...) for the importance of animalism and applying that case to recent critiques. (shrink)

Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are (...) themselves substantive. (shrink)

Most behavioral decision research takes place in carefully controlled laboratory settings, and examination of relationships between performance and specific real-world decision outcomes is rare. One prior study shows that people who perform better on hypothetical decision tasks, assessed using the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) measure, also tend to experience better real-world decision outcomes, as reported on the Decision Outcomes Inventory (DOI). The DOI score reflects avoidance of outcomes that could result from poor decisions, ranging from serious (e.g., bankruptcy) to minor (...) (e.g., blisters from sunburn). The present analyses go beyond the initial work, which focused on the overall DOI score, by analyzing the relationships between specific decision outcomes and A-DMC performance. Most outcomes are significantly more likely among people with lower A-DMC scores, even after taking into account two variables expected to produce worse real-world decision outcomes: younger age and lower socio-economic status. We discuss the usefulness of DOI as a measure of successful real-world decision making. (shrink)

Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.

I introduce and argue for a Priority Principle, according to which we exemplify certain of our mental properties in the primary or non-derivative sense. I then apply this principle to several debates in the metaphysics and philosophy of mind.

There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.

According to theists, God is an immaterial thinking being. The main question of this article is whether theism supports the view that we are immaterial thinking beings too. I shall argue in the negative. Along the way, I will also explore some implications in the philosophy of mind following from the observation that, on theism, God’s mentality is in a certain respect magical.

Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.

According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.

Here's an interesting question: what are we? David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer: we are simple. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnett's argument fails. First, there aren't any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper (...) part of another conscious thing. I conclude by showing how both moves comport with materialist theories of what we are and then apply them to another anti-materialist argument. (shrink)

Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition. And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate (...) theories of composition in defense of their views. And as it turns out, these strange cases are an interesting source of evidence for moderate theories of composition. (shrink)

Some incompatibilists about free will or moral responsibility and determinism would abandon their incompatibilism were they to learn that determinism is true. But is it reasonable to flip-flop in this way? In this article, we contend that it is and show what follows. The result is both a defense of a particular incompatibilist strategy and a general framework for assessing other cases of flip-flopping.

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...) then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence. (shrink)

The interpretation of the dead donor rule (DDR) has been central to recent debates regarding normothermic regional perfusion with controlled donation after circulatory death (NRP-cDCD). Proponents...

Aristotle famously held that objects are comprised of matter and form. That is the central doctrine of hylomorphism (sometimes rendered “hylemorphism”—hyle, matter; morphe, form), and the view has become a live topic of inquiry today. Contemporary proponents of the doctrine include Jeffrey Brower, Kit Fine, David Hershenov, Mark Johnston, Kathrin Koslicki, Anna Marmodoro, Michael Rea, and Patrick Toner, among others. In the wake of these contemporary hylomorphic theories the doctrine has seen application to various topics within mainstream analytic metaphysics. Here, (...) appeals to form and matter are used to shed light on problems about ontology, personal identity, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion. The current entry documents this resurgence of interest in hylomorphism, the ways it has been applied, and its reception. (shrink)

In this article, we identify three key design dimensions along which cryptocurrencies differ -- privacy, censorship-resistance, and consensus procedure. Each raises important normative issues. Our discussion uncovers new ways to approach the question of whether Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies should be used as money, and new avenues for developing a positive answer to that question. A guiding theme is that progress here requires a mixed approach that integrates philosophical tools with the purely technical results of disciplines like computer science and (...) economics. Note: this article is the second entry within a two-part sequence on the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency. (shrink)

Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.

Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...) this relation is nothing short of identity. According to animalists, we do not only coincide with or constitute or inhabit or otherwise hang out with these close associates, our animals: we are them. In this article, I offer an opinionated take on what animalism might be and situate it against contemporary rivals. Then, I outline a simple case for animalism. Finally, I sketch non-standard routes for animalists to take in light of standard challenges. My goal in all of this is to open up some new avenues of animalist thinking. (shrink)

For good or for ill, we have animal bodies. Through them, we move around, eat and drink, and do many other things besides. We owe much – perhaps our very lives – to these ever-present animals. But how exactly do we relate to our animals? Are we parts of them, or they of us? Do we and these living animals co-inhere or constitute or coincide? Or what? Animalism answers that we are identical to them. There are many objections to animalism, (...) and a dizzying array of rival views. In this article, we do not propose to evaluate those objections and rivals. We will instead present a new argument for that view. The argument begins with the fact that we have emotions. (shrink)

In this article, we develop and defend a new argument for animalism -- the thesis that we human persons are human animals. The argument takes this rough form: since our pets are animals, we are too. We’ll begin with remarks on animalism and its rivals, develop our main argument, and then defend it against a few replies.

Despite increased calls for hospital ethics committees to serve as default decision-makers about life-sustaining treatment for unrepresented patients who lack decision-making capacity or a surrogate decision-maker and whose wishes regarding medical care are not known, little is known about how committees currently function in these cases. This was a retrospective cohort study of all ethics committee consultations involving decision-making about LST for unrepresented patients at a large academic hospital from 2007 to 2013. There were 310 ethics committee consultations, twenty-five of (...) which involved unrepresented patients. In thirteen cases, the ethics consultants evaluated a possible substitute decision-maker identified by social workers and/or case managers. In the remaining cases, the ethics consultants worked with the medical team to contact previous healthcare professionals to provide substituted judgement, found prior advance care planning documents, or identified the patient’s best interest as the decision-making standard. In the majority of cases, the final decision was to limit or withdraw LST or to change code status to Do Not Resuscitate/Do Not Intubate. Substitute decision-makers who had been evaluated through the ethics consultation process and who made the final decision alone were more likely to continue LST than cases in which physicians made the final decision. In our centre, the primary role of ethics consultants in decision-making for unrepresented patients is to identify appropriate decision-making standards. In the absence of other data suggesting that ethics committees, as currently constituted, are ready to serve as substitute decision-makers for unrepresented patients, caution is necessary before designating these committees as default decision-makers. (shrink)